dissolution. This writer thinks, however, that this approach would be unrealistic, despite its short run advantages.

While this paper has discussed some of the long run consequences of industrialization for underdeveloped areas, it does not imply that there cannot be any cultural continuity, or cultural forms which are peculiar to the society in question. A good deal of variation in industrialized societies is possible. There is no evidence, for example, that any of the following have to change: music, art, religious beliefs about the non-empirical world, and many folkways.

It must be reiterated that there is no implication that any non-industrial society must accept the pattern of development outlined in this paper. However, insofar as a society does accept the value of industrialization and seeks to bring it about, then the development discussed above is to be expected.

THE EURASIAN MINORITY IN INDONESIA

JUSTUS M. VAN DER KROEF
Michigan State College

Perhaps no single population group among the races and peoples of Indonesia has aroused so much interest since the war as the Eurasian minority. Both in the Netherlands and in the Indonesian Republic the problem of the Indo-European or Indo, as the Eurasian is generally called, has reached a certain acuteness, which contributes to the steadily deteriorating relationship between the two countries. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the origin of the Indo problem, its status in colonial and in present day Indonesian society, and to suggest possible means of resolving it.

The Indo problem is aggravated by the fact that there are no precise data on the number of Eurasians. The last time that an effort was made to count the number of Eurasians in Indonesia was in 1834, when it was found that over 9,000 of the 18,000 Europeans in Java possessed what was referred to as “the characteristic skin color” of the Indo, while an additional 5,600 of Europeans born in the Indies without this telltale mark were also regarded as being of mixed blood. Colonial law classified the Eurasian as European, insofar as he had legally been recognized as such, but it is likely that the number of Eurasians far exceeds even the 300,000 persons classified as Europeans in 1941. For in this 300,000 are not included the thousands upon thousands of mestizos with full blood European ancestors who through circumstances were absorbed by indigenous Indonesian society and thus came to be classified legally as “native.” According to one observer, the total number of mestizos with white ancestors among the Indonesians in 1940 was from 8 to 9 million.1 This figure has been criticized as too large, but even so it should be noted that the overwhelming majority of persons classified as Europeans by colonial law were Indos; according to one estimate 90 per cent of the legally categorized Europeans were of mixed blood around 1930,2 and while the full blood European group increased in the decade 1930–1940, this percentage is probably still roughly accurate for the composition of the European group at the outbreak of the Second World War. Since the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian Revolution the Indo group has generally declined; hundreds perished during the occupation and its aftermath, tens of thousands have migrated to the Netherlands and to Western Irian (New Guinea); in Indonesia some retain their exclusive “Indo” orientation while others have “assimilated” with the Indonesians as is expected of good warganegara (citizens) of a national Indonesian


state and have attempted to de-emphasize their “Indo” status with varying degrees of success.

Even before the coming of the Dutch there had been Portuguese mestizos in the Indies. Later when the Dutch secured a foothold in the archipelago some of these mestizos came under the control of the Dutch East India Company. The city of Batavia, the chief Dutch settlement and the headquarters of the Company, soon contained a large number of Eurasians, some the descendants of Portuguese mestizos, others of Mardijkers and Papangers. Mardijkers (from the Portuguese mahar-dika or “free man”) had originally been Christian slaves in Portuguese service who were captured by the Dutch; most came from Bengal and India. Papangers were Filipinos, originally brought by the Spaniards to the East Indies and taken prisoner by the Dutch. Both groups served the Dutch as mercenaries and since they were Christians their treatment was far better than that accorded native Indonesians. Mardijkers and Papangers in the course of time intermarried with each other and with Portuguese mestizos. The result was that the first Eurasian groups in the Dutch colonial society were a distinctly alien cultural element: their names, language, customs and manners were a mixture of Malay and Portuguese and as “Portuguese” they were known and continued to exist as a distinct Indo minority until deep into the nineteenth century.6

Apart from the “Portuguese” group—though later mixed with it—existed a growing group of so-called Mixtiezen (mestizos), usually the offspring of illegal unions. Depending on the degree of purity of their European blood they were categorized as Castiezen, Pustiezen and Christiezen (roughly one half, one quarter, and one eighth Indonesian respectively), terms which had no legal importance but did indicate differences in social standing.4 For the attitude of the full blood Calvinistic Netherlander toward “Portuguese” and mestizos was generally colored by a resentment of their “foreign” manners and their religious practices and by a sense of racial superiority. Although in the days of the Company the population was divided on the basis of religion and not of race8 and the Eurasian had a status theoretically on a par with the full blood Christian, in reality discrimination was quite apparent socially as well as in employment practices.6 As early as 1617 whites who had married with a native Indonesian were denied repatriation, later this prohibition was extended to those married to a Eurasian.7 Mixed marriages themselves were not prohibited, provided both partners were Christians. Due to the acute shortage of European immigrant women such unions flourished through the centuries. Yet Dutch writers in Company days continued to denounce Eurasian women as lazy, immoral and generally worthless,8 though the European women occasionally imported were certainly not of better quality. Indonesian women—later especially imported from Bali—swelled the settlement of Batavia too. Their generally illegitimate Eurasian offspring occasionally succeeded in maintaining a sort of “honorary” status, but most led a peculiarly marginal existence on the brink of poverty and disaster.

In the nineteenth century the Eurasian problem comes more forcibly to the fore. The end of the Company and the advent of national control over the Indies made the Eurasian a Netherlands subject, yet different legal classifications prevented any public homogeneity from coming into existence. The prized “European” status was no longer given to most Christians, descent from a European father or legal recognition by him

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5 W. E. van Mastenbroek, De historische ontwikkeling van de staatsrechtelijke indeling der bevolking van Nederlandsch-Indië (Dissertation; Wageningen, 1934), p. 46.
6 In 1676 the Company was ordered to employ as few mestizos as possible, earlier they were barred from holding positions as clerks. In 1753 Company officials born in the Indies were deprived of pension. Koks, p. 27.
7 Koks, p. 13.
8 See for example the classic account of Nicolaus de Graaff, published in 1701 in E. du Perron, ed., De Muse van Jan Companje, Bandoeng, 1948, pp. 111-117.
now had to be proved. Many Eurasians "went Indonesian," others—in the absence of any government care—eked out an increasingly difficult existence as clerks or petty officials. Their ranks continued to grow, however, thanks to the tacit recognition given to two hallowed Dutch colonial institutions: barracks concubinage and the planter's njai (housekeeper). Concubinage has had a lengthy tradition in Dutch colonial society. In the later days of the East India Company there were more illegitimate births out of Christian fathers than legitimate ones, while in the middle of the nineteenth century concubinage was an accepted part of the mores of the city of Batavia and the illegitimate spouse received the same respect as the legitimate one. Among the European military of lower ranks in the Indies concubinage had been permitted since 1836. In 1888, for example, more than 22 per cent of European military lived with their concubines in the barracks, in 1909 almost 26 per cent; later the system declined as European women became more plentiful. But in 1902 the number of illegitimate children of European military born out of concubinage was still twice as large as the number of legitimate ones. Not all of these children were "recognized" by their fathers, many disappeared into Indonesian society; sometimes professional "recognizers"—retired European military who for a fee of a couple of bottles of gin were willing to declare anyone as their offspring—did the job, and thus the prized "European" status was attained. In the group of officers, officials, planters and professional men from the highest to the lowest conditions were not much better. The shortage of European women and the fear of jeopardizing one's future by a mé丝毫不ance with an Indonesian led to the widespread practice of keeping njais: of the Preangar region in Western Java south of Batavia, one government report noted in 1902, that of the hundred unmarried males over eighteen, ninety were living in concubinage.10

Government provisions for integrating this growing class of Eurasians as useful members of colonial society, were woefully inadequate throughout the nineteenth century. Educational facilities were few and of inferior quality, few Eurasians received any training in Europe, and so they had to be content with the lower positions in government and private enterprise. Though life in the European community in the nineteenth century was peculiarly adapted to its Indonesian surroundings and a certain colonial Eurasian culture pattern predominated, the Eurasian himself was often a second class member of this community, an object of ridicule to Dutch immigrants and to Dutch colonial novelists alike, who sneered at his broken Dutch, his aping of European manners, and his pretensions to social equality. Neglect often forced the Indo into the ranks of the paupers, living on the edge of the Indonesian kampong (village or native quarter) or ultimately disappearing into it. For this group of the population a white skin color, perfect "Dutch" manners and European legal status became major, deeply desired and yet remote goals in their existence. The author of a useful novel about the poverty stricken Indos, described these ambitions well: the Indo girl "will surrender everything in order to be married to a white man; and the unexpressed thought is: the desire for white-skinned children."12

In the nineteenth century the Indo community began to display its inner social structure more clearly. At the top were the few who had attained a measure of wealth and respectability as estate owners and entrepreneurs. In this group also belong the members of two government branches, which for a majority were composed of Indos, namely the commissioned ranks of the army and the civil service. But in terms of the total Indo community this group was a minority, furthermore Dutch import-export concerns and Western enterprises generally discriminated against Eurasians. The small Indo elite retained its position solely by virtue of its superior education and training obtained in Europe, even so one authority has described their existence as "a continuous struggle for equal rights in government

10 Data from van Marle, pp. 481-486.
positions" with those born in Holland. Generally their style of living was that of landed gentry; their houses were large and spacious, with an abundance of servants, they "breathed an atmosphere of hospitality and generosity." Toward the Indonesian the Indo élite had a paternalistic attitude, a sense of the "grand seigneur." By the twentieth century this largesse and semi-aristocratic opulence had largely declined however, nor was this class even in the nineteenth century free from the prejudices of the full blood Dutch group.

The second class and middle layer of Indo society was composed of a large number of petty officials, clerks and subalterns with some form of education beyond the elementary level, whose life in most cases was European in name only. For most of them the struggle to retain their position was even more difficult than for the first class, although during most of the nineteenth century their modest jobs were fairly secure. Something of the semi-aristocratic style of living also penetrated to them (hospitality, love of hunting), but in this group the consciousness of the prized European status was far stronger and the efforts to retain it and act in accordance with it far more contrived. The old "Portugese" group belonged largely to this second class although by 1900 their earlier "Portugese" characteristics had been lost. The lowest rung of the social ladder in Indo society was occupied by the pauper element, living on the border of or in the kampong, leading an existence largely Indonesianized and precariously balanced on handicraft, trade, or more often on organized crime. Most of the paupers had had a smattering of education and had a passing acquaintance with the Dutch language in some form. In these last two groups the enmity toward the growing group of full blood European immigrants (totoks) was perhaps most intense and the peculiar minority myth of social superiority to both Indonesians and totoks was perhaps strongest.

Due to the lack of social incentive and of government care, in the absence of proper educational facilities, the majority of Indos were assigned a social status in which they were forever made to feel inferior and a target of ridicule. Their inability to speak Dutch fluently was criticized, yet the facilities to teach them to speak the language properly were altogether inadequate; their indolence and supposedly inferior intelligence was said to be "proverbial," yet incentives to emancipation were withheld. In the twentieth century these aspects of the Indo problem became even more acute. The growing number of European immigrants constituted an increasing source of competition in the more rewarding positions in the administration and in private enterprise. The colonial culture pattern of the previous century disappeared, European society became more "European," more oriented toward the West and even less inclined to accept the Indo as one of its own. At the same time the Indo petty official class began to experience the competitive pressures of trained Indonesians and its position became extremely precarious. With the development of political life in the first two decades of the present century the Indos joined hands in the establishment in 1919 of a party of their own, the Indo Europeesch Verbond (IEV) with a program that stressed economic assistance to and social emancipation of the Eurasian. Politically IEV was not very successful, even though its delegation in the Volksraad, colonial Indonesia's semi-parliament, was consistently one of the largest. For its spokesmen were in the habit of advocating the unity of all Netherlanders born in Indonesia, including those with full blood parents and of classifying as Indos all Dutchmen whose "lasting interest" lay in the Indies. At an earlier time this advocacy of a common interest between full blood and Indo might have found support; in the twentieth century however, with its steady "Europeanization" of the full blood community and its increased class conscious-

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13 Koks, p. 263.
14 Wertheim, Herrijzend Azië, p. 64.
15 Koks, pp. 228–254.
ness, such an appeal largely fell on deaf ears. Many full blood Europeans born in the Indies who in their style of living might have approximated the better educated Indo gradually turned from any assimilation with the mestizo, and their children increased the distance between themselves and the Eurasian even further. In the words of one student of the problem: 18

In earlier years children born in the Indies conceived of themselves as "Indian children," regardless of their origin, they talked with the same accent, had the same customs and laughed together at the few, Holland-born 'cheese-heads' in school. But in later years something of the social antithesis between whites and Eurasians also had penetrated into the world of children.

The lines of class demarcation became sharper in the period of the IEV's existence; as a result its appeal to concord with Indonesia-born full bloods was criticized as an attempt to climb to an élite status in society on the back of the full blood. Notwithstanding social rebuffs the IEV generally persisted in this orientation and in the course of time developed a marked, pro-Dutch conservatism, an attitude of plus Hollandais que les Hollandais, that led not a few of its members to espouse the cause of the NSB, the colonial fascist party in sympathy with Hitler, whose racial ideologies they apparently felt were not inconsistent with their own origin and status. Some IEV leaders even went so far as to announce the ultimate creation of a Eurasian society in Indonesia, a social nucleus around which both Europeans and the Indonesian intelligentsia would be integrated and which would peaceably resolve the colonial conflict between Hollanders and emancipated Indonesian. Hence the only viewpoint which would in the end exist in Indonesia according to this opinion would be the "Eurasian" one. 19 Pronouncements such as these not only antagonized the full blood Dutch element, but what was perhaps worse also the leaders of the growing Indonesian nationalist movement to whom the IEV had long since become anathema.

The realization that he really could not do without a continuation of Dutch control, even though on occasion he too demanded greater autonomy for Indonesia within a Dutch Commonwealth, was primarily responsible for the Indo's conservative bent in the decades just before the war. His actions continued to reflect his paradoxical position in colonial society. On the one hand he insisted that he was a "European" and expected to be treated as such, yet it was as an Indo that he informed the government of his economic plight and asked its assistance. It was as a "European" that he joined the ranks of colonial die-hards, but as an Indo complained that he could not make a living and asked the government to consider the sale of land to him, something forbidden to all non-native Indonesians by colonial law. 20 It was as a European that he informed a government committee investigating political wishes in 1941 of the discrimination against him by private Western enterprises, 21 but it was as an Indo that he urged the government to make of Western New Guinea a colonization area primarily for Eurasians.

Yet at one time, early in the twentieth century, there had been a good chance that the Indo might find a home in a group or party that advocated the political and cultural assimilation of all population groups, Europeans, Eurasians, Indonesians, and other Orientals, and that his precarious position would resolve itself into ethnic and social harmony. Such a party, the Indische Partij, had in fact been founded in 1912 by a talented Eurasian, E. Douwes Dekker, who had hoped to make of it a forum of progressive political action, regardless of racial origin. 22 The caste consciousness and social stratification of the period between the two world wars wrecked such assimilation schemes, although a few Eurasians, like Dekker, continued to propagate the idea that the future of the Indo lay in union and assimilation with the Indonesian, not in the retention of Dutch imposed class consciousness.

Except for this minority of Eurasians, relations between the Indos and the Indone-

18 Wertheim, Herrijzend Aisië, p. 69.
21 Verslag van de Commissie tot bestudeering van Staatsrechtelijke Hervormingen, Vol. 11, p. 87.
22 Van den Bijlaardt, pp. 6–18.
sians deteriorated steadily. The growing class of educated native commoners with their nationalist aspirations competed increasingly with the Indos in all walks of life traditionally regarded as “Eurasian.” Whatever the Indo did to defend himself aroused the antagonism of the Indonesian: if he pointed to his loyalty to the Dutch regime, he gave the impression that the Indonesian was disloyal; if he pointed to his long period of faithful service, he made the Indonesian out to be an untried and brash newcomer; if he pointed to his historic place in colonial society, he implied that the Indonesian was traditionally a hewer of wood and a drawer of water.23 Yet against Indonesian competition the Indo was fighting a lost battle. As Sutan Sjahrir, the outstanding Indonesian nationalist leader wrote: 24 “The Indos gradually become Indonesians, whether they want to or not . . . even if they would retain their ‘European’ status legally, the process of social transformation is making them one with the Indonesians, of whom many more will be academically trained in the near future, than all Indos put together.” Their inability to understand the consequences of this “Westernization” of the Indonesian put the Indo in the peculiar position that he was in, argued Sjahrir: “they get the pressure from both sides and as a result they are all a bit twisted psychologically.”

The Japanese occupation of Indonesia greatly amplified the Indo problem. Early in 1942 the Japanese introduced a racial classification system for Indos, based on the racial origin of their fathers: (1) a European father with an Indonesian or Eurasian wife (2) an Indo father with an Indo, European or Indonesian wife and (3) an Indonesian father with a European or a Eurasian wife. Every Indo was expected to prove his descent.25 Most Indos who were offspring of unions in the last two categories were given a choice: they could either side with the full blood Dutch and be certain of a harrowing existence in some concentration camp or they could renounce their European status, become Indonesians and ipso facto supporters of Japan’s “Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Indos with parents in the first category were virtually automatically deemed unsafe and imprisoned; how many in the other categories elected to remain—or perhaps “become”—Europeans is not known. It is certain that thousands of Indos decided to become Indonesians for the time being and not a few openly collaborated with the Japanese. As the war wore on the Japanese adopted an increasingly hostile attitude toward the Indo group, accusing it of retaining its “European” outlook.26 Toward the end of the war hundreds of Indos were arrested. As usual the Indos as a group were mistrusted by all concerned: by the Japanese because of their suspected European loyalties; by the Europeans because of their collaborationist behavior, and by Indonesians because of their pre-war conservatism and hostility to nationalist aims. This distrust as well as the Japanese classification system undoubtedly increased the psychological tensions within the Indo minority. Colonial society had put a premium on European status and in that society many Indos had learned to ward off any threatening “Indonesianization” at all possible costs. Now admission of European status was equal to placing one’s life in jeopardy, while in choosing the despised Indonesian status lay relative safety.

In the period of revolution following Japan’s defeat this new orientation of the Indo’s position continued. The leaders of the Indonesian Republic set great store by national unity among all population groups. But meanwhile scores of Indos were molested and murdered by Indonesian extremists who apparently regarded the despised blanda item (literally “Black white man”—a common Indonesian epithet for the Indo) as even more dangerous than the Dutch.27 Some Indos, among them the redoubtable Douwes Dekker who had assumed an Indonesian name and had become a member of

23 Koks, p. 246.
the Republic’s cabinet, urged all Indos to Indonesianize themselves and to abandon their class consciousness. Such views were in line with Republican policy. During a conference of Indos in February, 1947, held in the Republic’s capital, Djokjakarta, Dekker maintained that it was “a psychological error” on the part of Indos to think that they were different from Indonesians. In the new Indonesia, according to Dekker, there should not be any minorities, who could become a pretext for aggression by some foreign power, i.e. the Dutch. The only solution to the Indo problem was assimilation: “Think Indonesian, become Indonesian, act Indonesian.” 28 This appeal attracted only a minority of Indos at the time however, most Indos who had been incarcerated during the war sought the safety of the Dutch controlled coastal cities upon their release and there a revived IEV openly urged Indos to proclaim their loyalty to the Dutch cause. As tales of revolutionaries molesting Indos spread, the anti-Republican sentiment among the Indos rapidly increased and thousands of them took an active part in the military actions of the Dutch against the Republic. Others left the country. Early in 1947 the melancholy exodus of Indos to the Netherlands began, their numbers swelling by the hundreds, until by 1953 some 100,000 had gone to Holland where their presence caused severe socio-economic problems for the struggling post war governments.

Even before December, 1949 when the Netherlands formally transferred her sovereignty over the Indies to the Indonesian Republic and the latter became an independent state, three possible solutions of the Indo problem had been suggested. The first places its faith in the eventual absorption of Indos in the Netherlands. Indeed scores of the better trained Indos who have migrated to the Netherlands have had no difficulty in finding jobs and adjusting themselves to life in their nominal fatherland, which not a few of them had never seen before. It is to be feared that they are in a minority however. For years thousands of less fortunate Indos who had migrated had been forced to live in camps on a mere government pittance; neither adequate housing nor sufficient jobs were available. Furthermore, while in Holland society is more democratic and less caste conscious by far than one time colonial Dutch society, there has been some resentment of and discrimination against the 2ipper (an uncomplimentary epithet for the Indo in use among full bloods). To be sure, Holland has for centuries been familiar with retired Indies hands, many of them Indos, who in such cities as the Hague and Amersfoort, preserved something of their Eurasian and colonial style of living. But they were generally wealthy and not present in such large numbers, nor were they generally of the same class as the majority of the present Indo immigrants, many of whom seem to have more pronounced “Eurasian” features, speak a broken Dutch dialect and have had less education than the old timers. For most of the Indos now in Holland, Europe is something learned out of a textbook, neither the climate nor the living conditions suit them. And finally there is the fact that even without the Indo minority Holland is a severely overpopulated country, where hundreds of native born seek emigration visas annually. The poverty stricken Indo immigrant merely swells the labor market, and since his training has in the majority of cases not been on a par with that of the average Hollander, he is inevitably becoming a public burden, a hindrance to the post war reconstruction of the country.

The second approach to the problem entails mass migration of Indos to new colonization areas. One such area that has been suggested is Western New Guinea, or Irian. Control over Irian is still in the hands of the Dutch, though Indonesian leaders have indicated that they will not rest until the area is part of their country. Negotiations concerning the future status of Irian have dragged on for years and have been punctuated by failure, all of which has greatly strained relations between the two countries. At present a little under four thousand Indos have migrated to Irian to lead a pioneer existence in the development of the area. Private pressure groups and business interests in Holland support the idea, but the Dutch government has been reluctant to give Indo colonization of Irian its

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active assistance. One reason is the strain in the relations with Indonesia. Another, perhaps more important, reason is that pre-war Indo colonization efforts in Irian, sponsored by the IEV in conjunction with the colonial government were complete failures. Further, the actual resources of the area have been greatly exaggerated and it is a question of whether all, or even a majority of Indos, are suited for the rough and tumble of life in the bush. Those Indos that have gone to the area since the end of the war have little to recommend them at present except their tenacity; thus far their “colonization” has been unrewarding and badly planned and not a few have requested return passage home. Finally a noticeable reluctance to leave their European surroundings, however difficult at present, for a socially uncertain if economically better “mestizo” existence elsewhere has been evident in the ranks of the Indo immigrants. European status and class consciousness are often too deeply ingrained in them to make them willing to abandon its psychological security for an unknown environment outside Europe.

After 1949 the problem of the Indo immigrant became so acute that the Dutch government cast about for other colonization areas in which to settle them. Brazil has been suggested as one area, and a few Eurasians have gone to that country both before and since the war. Early in 1953 the government completed arrangements for the mass deportation of thousands of Indo immigrants to French New Caledonia, and the first of these have already left for the southwest Pacific. Others are contemplating settlement in the New Hebrides and in the West Indies. Immigration to such areas is hampered in the main by two factors. First there is the question of expense, not just the expenses of transport but also of providing the immigrants with funds to enable them to make a new start. The measures taken by the Indonesian government to combat inflation have led to severe curtailments of the export of capital from Indonesia, including accumulated pension and savings. The Indo migrant has no reserve to fall back on. The second factor is a racial one: “nearly all the more popular pioneer lands have rigid colour bars which effectively exclude Eurasians.” The peculiar class orientation of the Eurasian makes it essential for him to live in a country where his mixed racial origin will not, as in the case of colonial Indonesia, become a major social liability.

The third and last solution is based on the assimilation of the Eurasian in Indonesian society. About 100,000, or a little over half of the pre-war Indo group which regarded itself as Indo, or had been classified as European by colonial law, still remain behind in the Indies, most of them voluntarily. They include an indispensable small section who hold top positions in the administration and in business. The far greater majority of the remainder are those for whom a transition to an “Indonesian” outlook presents no great difficulty, since they were members of the two bottom levels of the pre-war Indo society, i.e. the paupers and the lower elements in the class of petty officials and subalterns. The middle stratum, about 30 per cent of the group, is placed in the most difficult position of all, however; among them the prestige factor of European status—often taken for granted by the Indo elite—is strongest, and resistance to assimilation with the Indonesian has been branded into them for generations. Some will eventually succeed in leaving the country, thanks also to the pressure exerted by their class-conscious fellows in the Netherlands, but for most there will through various circumstance be no such opportunity. Their only hope will lie in a psychological adjustment, an assimilation of mind and culture, as well as an eventual racial amalgamation.

The objections that have been raised against the continued existence of the Eurasian in Indonesia and to his eventual assimilation do not appear to be very valid. On the one hand it has been argued that leaving the Indos in Indonesia will “irreversibly mean, sooner or later, an ‘Asiatic’ living standard” for them, a debasement of

29 On these early colonization schemes see J. Winsenius, Nieuw Guinee als kolonisatiegebied voor Europeaan en van Indo-Europeanen (Dissertation; Amsterdam, 1936).

the Indo’s worth to himself and to society.\textsuperscript{21} The fact of the matter is that long before the Second World War perhaps a third of the Indo group already had an “Asiatic” living standard: in 1934, for example, Indo clerks could be had for 10 guilders a month, and Indos trained at the Technical Institute were willing to work for the “Asiatic” wage of 4 cents an hour.\textsuperscript{32} In the lower two levels of Indo society a standard of living was generally the rule which was certainly not that of the full blood European, but rather that of the skilled and semi-educated native Indonesian. While it is true that since attaining independence Indonesia’s economy has been in a precarious condition and that the country will, as a whole, have to put up with living standards below those of before the war, it should also be noted that the Indonesian government is willing and able to pay well for trained personnel, and the same holds true for private enterprise. Since Indonesia has a dearth of trained technicians and well educated administrators, the Indo, by virtue of even the little training he has had, is often in a position to keep an economic position superior to that of the average Indonesian: in the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king. With the development of Indonesia’s productive resources, a better living standard is in the ofing, not only for the Indonesian, but also for the Indo group. By identifying himself with the growing class of educated Indonesians, and not with the remnants of the Indo-European élite, the Indo can be adequately absorbed in the expanding economy of the country. But the \textit{sine qua non} is again that he must regard himself as a son of the country, a citizen of a growing young republic, and not as a member of a grieving, alien minority.

Another objection to Indo assimilation that has been raised is that as a result of independence Indonesia will revert back to an “Indonesian” culture pattern, that “the former synthesis of East and West is a thing of the past,” and that “the Eurasians, as the very embodiment of that synthesis are placed in a cruel dilemma.”\textsuperscript{33} Such a view can only be maintained at the cost of ignoring the entire process of cultural change now underway virtually everywhere in Indonesia, which puts a premium on a dynamic adjustment of the “native” element to modern twentieth century civilization and on a large scale Westernization of government, social relations, the family, religion, art and cultural standards.\textsuperscript{34} It also ignores the pronounced “Western” orientation of most modern Indonesian leaders. Far from placing “East” and “West” in antithetical positions and crushing the Indo between them, Indonesia is seeking to blend them. In the words of Supomo, president of the University of Indonesia:\textsuperscript{35} “we should refrain from using the terms ‘West’ and ‘East’ as two ‘opposite sides’ in the same way as black and white, but what we should do is accept all that is good from the West and from the East.” And far from returning to a traditional Oriental social order, in which the Indo’s position would indeed be untenable, Indonesia seems to be heeding the words of its vice-president, the veteran nationalist Mohammad Hatta:\textsuperscript{36} “Our world view is not static . . . but \textit{historic-dynamic}. Therefore historic thinking should be the objective in the education of our youth, the thinking which includes the conviction that every thing will pass, that nothing is permanent.” In such a “historic-dynamic” process of adjustment and change the Indo can plan an indispensable role in the synthesis of East and West in the country. In the past his function in this connection has often been unique. One is reminded, for example, of the \textit{Stamboel}, the popular Indonesian opera, invented by a Eurasian, who translated the score of European operas into Malay, transposed the music often in a most original way and used Indonesian characters. \textit{Stamboel} was

\textsuperscript{34}See J. M. van der Kroef, “Patterns of Western Influence in Indonesia,” \textit{American Sociological Review}, XVII (1952), pp. 421–430.
\textsuperscript{35}In the \textit{Times of Indonesia}, Djakarta, Indonesia, December 12, 1952.
\textsuperscript{36}Mohammad Hatta, \textit{Verspreide Geschriften}, Amsterdam, Djakarta, 1952, p. 581. Italics in original.
immensely popular among all population groups in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, a unique form of cultural synthesis of Eurasian origin.

Despite pessimistic predictions to the contrary there are definite signs that the Indos are making an adequate adjustment to the new social and political realities in Indonesia. For example in 1949 a new Eurasian group was founded, the Partai Indo Nasional with a program that demanded recognition for the Indo minority as full fledged warga negara (citizens) of the Indonesian Republic, as one group among many population groups loyally supporting the national state. While recognizing the peculiar position of the Eurasian, the party proclaimed Indos to be Indonesians and even went so far as to advocate the ultimate inclusion of Irian into Indonesian territory. Indos have succeeded in securing leading positions in government and private enterprise and far from being regarded as an untrustworthy minority there are indications that other population groups are beginning to look on them as belonging to the country. Daily the process of peaceful assimilation goes forward.

There is every reason to believe that that process will continue. For insofar as the Indo in Indonesia was a problem, he was a colonial problem, one of the unhappy aspects of an artificially created and socially enforced stratification and caste consciousness called into existence by the very nature of Dutch control. Where the pressure to be a member of the European élite has disappeared the social-psychological tensions will decrease and the “chip on the shoulder” attitude necessary to assert one’s “European” status will become meaningless. The racial connotation of Indo status has vanished with the decline of blond haired, white skinned, full blood superiority in society. There is now no longer any racial criterion that sets the Indo apart. Many Indos look like full blood Indonesians, indeed some are even darker skinned than the Indonesians themselves. The only criterion that will remain is that of “Indo consciousness,” so long as they feel themselves a minority apart, the Eurasians will be treated like one. But if the desire for assimilation exists the Indonesian government has the task of eliminating all vestiges of discrimination against the Indo, of absorbing him without regard for erstwhile status into all branches of government and enterprise on an equal footing with other nationals. Then and only then will the Indo problem be solved and will the day dawn, also for the Indo, of his awakening out of “the bad dream of having belonged to ‘God’s stepchildren,’” and will he become “a child of his own country, a man among other men.”

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37 Kepartaian di Indonesia, Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia; Djakarta, 1951, pp. 374–377.

38 Wertheim, Het Sociologisch Karakter, p. 16.

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AN INVESTIGATION OF THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF SOCIAL CLASSES *

STANLEY ARTHUR HETZLER

The Ohio State University

This study is an examination of social position in relation to social stratification. It poses the question whether American society consists of a few fairly discernable social strata or of a multitude of overlapping social positions. The approach to this problem is by means of a simple profile scale which is designed to avoid forcing responses into predetermined categories. Where the majority of social class studies have requested the respondents to identify themselves with one of a set number of classes, this scale abstains from